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ESSAYS ON SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIO
CHOICE
Siqiang Yang, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This dissertation analyzes portfolio choice problems in different contexts. In the first chap-
ter, Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility, Default Risk and Reserve Accumulation, I investigate
how nominal exchange rate volatility affects a sovereign’s portfolio choice between how much
debt to acquire and how much reserves to accumulate. First, I document a positive correla-
tion between nominal exchange rate volatility and sovereign default risk and show that this
relationship becomes stronger when more of the external debt is denominated in foreign cur-
rency. Then, I build a sovereign default model to rationalize these findings and to quantify
the channels that contribute to the large reserve holdings among emerging countries.
In the second chapter, Household Portfolio Accounting, we document and analyze the
substantial heterogeneity in household portfolio composition in the United States. We con-
sider a standard life-cycle model with labor income risk and portfolio choice, augmented with
a savings wedge that lowers the return on saving, and a risky wedge that lowers the relative
return on risky assets. Using U.S. survey data (2004-2016), we compute the household-level
wedges that rationalize the data. The chapter has two main contributions: first, it uses the
wedges to guide plausible frictions that researchers should consider in their models. Second,
it analyzes the extent to which household characteristics can account for the wedges.
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1.0 Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility, Default Risk and Reserve
Accumulation
1.1 Introduction
During the last thirty years, emerging countries have borrowed extensively from international
markets in foreign currency. From 1990 to 2015, 90% of long-term public debt is denomi-
nated in a foreign currency among emerging countries. Large access to credit can facilitate
investment and growth, but it may also add to vulnerabilities. Borrowing in foreign cur-
rency can make an indebted government vulnerable to volatile exchange rate fluctuations.
Whenever the nominal exchange rate depreciates, external debt burden in terms of domestic
currency increases, making it more difficult for the government to repay its debt, thereby
increasing its default risk.
The underlying intuition is consistent with the recent crisis in Turkey. On August 10th
2018, Turkey’s domestic currency Lira experienced a rapid depreciation of 18%, after US
announced a doubling of the steel and aluminum tariffs on Turkish imports. The large
depreciation was accompanied by a downgrade Turkey’s sovereign debt ratings, which indi-
cates a higher default risk. Specifically on Augest 16th 2018, European rating agency Scope
Ratings downgraded Turkey’s sovereign ratings to BB- from BB+. On Aug 17th, credit
ratings agencies Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded Turkey’s debt rating further
into junk, down to B+ (S&P) and Ba3 (Moody’s). Similar stories also happened in the
1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1995 Mexican peso crisis and other emerging country crises.
Given the widespread vulnerability due to foreign currency debt and volatile exchange rate
fluctuations, it is essential to have a precautionary measure to insure against the risk.
During the same period, there is a well-known fact that emerging countries have accumu-
lated foreign reserves at a fast pace. The paper argues that increasing reserve accumulation
is a natural response to the vulnerability resulting from foreign currency debt and volatile
exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, the paper aims to investigate how nominal exchange
rate volatility affects a sovereign’s default risk, the incentive to accumulate debt and reserves,
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and whether it can explain the large reserve holdings observed in the data.
To address these questions, I start by constructing a quarterly panel of 15 emerging
countries from 1991Q1-2015Q4 to study the empirical relation between nominal exchange
rate volatility, foreign currency debt, and sovereign default risk measured by interest rate
spread. The main novel finding is that higher nominal exchange rate volatility is significantly
correlated with higher default risk, and the positive correlation becomes stronger when more
of the external debt is denominated in foreign currency. The finding suggests that nominal
exchange rate volatility and foreign currency debt is important in understanding default risk.
The next step is to study this link in a sovereign default model, and assess its implications
on reserve accumulation.
The model builds on the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and Arellano (2008) sovereign
default model, where a government with income shocks borrows defaultable real debt to
smooth consumption. The paper extends the classic model along three dimensions. First, it
introduces two nominal assets denominated in foreign currency: One is defaultable long-term
debt, the other is non-defaultable short-term reserves. With different maturity for debt and
reserves, the government can borrow long-term debt and save in short-term reserves to help
smooth consumption when future borrowing becomes costly. This channel is well studied in
Bianchi et al. (2016): Because future value of long-term debt depends on the realizations
of future states, but future value of reserves is independent of future states, issuing debt to
accumulate reserves can effectively transfer resources from future good states to bad states.
Second, the paper considers a nominal exchange rate depreciation shock in addition to
the standard income shock. The shock captures unexpected capital inflows and outflows
that could affect a country’s nominal exchange rate. It implies that the depreciation shock
can change the domestic currency value of foreign currency debt and reserves. To allow the
shock to have a real effect, the model needs to isolate the effect of a depreciation shock on
domestic goods price. Following Aghion et al. (2004), the good price is assumed to be preset
for one period before knowing the future realization of depreciation shock. The sticky price
assumption can be thought of limited pass-thourgh from exchange rate to domestic price,
as shown in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000). The assumption implies that purchasing power
parity holds only ex ante for good prices, but it holds at any time for the asset prices. See
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Dornbusch (1976) for the different pass-through between asset prices and goods prices.
Third, to capture the idea that central banks may use reserves in foreign exchange market
to counter disruptive exchange rate movements, the model allows higher reserve holdings
to exogenously reduce the exchange rate volatility. One can interpret higher reserves as a
signal for higher capacity for the central bank to intervene in foreign exchange market, which
discourages speculative attacks and reduces the exchange rate volatility.
With these key features, the model provides three channels to explain the reserve ac-
cumulation. First, reserves can help smooth consumption when future borrowing becomes
costly, as in Bianchi et al. (2016). Second, reserves can provide a currency hedge against bad
depreciation shock. Since both debt and reserves are denominated in foreign currency, when-
ever nominal exchange rate depreciates, debt burden in terms of domestic currency increases,
but at the same time reserves in domestic currency also increases, which alleviates the effect
of exchange rate depreciation on the default risk. Third, reserves can reduce the exchange
rate volatility exogenously, and prevent a large exchange rate depreciation. When the gov-
ernment makes its portfolio choice decision between debt and reserves, it faces a tradeoff
between these three benefits of reserves with the cost of keeping larger gross debt positions
to accumulate reserves. To investigate the quantitative importance of these channels, the
model is then calibrated and applied for quantitative experiments.
The model is calibrated to mimic salient features of a typical emerging country: Mexico.
The calibrated model can generate more than half of reserve accumulation as in the data,
which suggests that the model channels are quantitatively important in explaining the reserve
accumulation. Then the model is applied for three experiments. First, we test the model
to see whether it can explain the increasing reserve holdings. The paper finds that if the
economy starts at a relative low exchange rate volatility regime, the increase in exchange
rate volatility can make the government optimally increase the reserve holdings. However,
if the economy starts at a relative high exchange rate volatility regime, further increase in
exchange rate volatility will push the government away from international market in the
sense of reducing both borrowing and reserves. Since emerging countries are in the stage of
moving from limited financial integration to rapid integration in the past thirty years, the
model prediction is consistent with the increasing reserve holdings.
3
Next, the paper investigates the quantitative relevance of using reserves to hedge against
currency depreciation. The experiment recalibrates the model where reserves are denomi-
nated in domestic currency. The result shows that in this case, the optimal reserve holdings
decrease 50% compared with the benchmark where reserves are in a foreign currency. The
result highlights the foreign currency feature of reserves to understand the reserve accumu-
lation. Last, the paper shows that using reserve to reduce the exchange rate volatility is
quantitatively important. The experiment shuts down this channel by letting exchange rate
volatility to be independent with reserve level. After recalibrating the model, the reserve
holdings become only one third of benchmark level. The result points out the essential role
of using reserves for foreign exchange market management.
Related Literature. The paper is mainly related to two different literatures. The
first is the sovereign default literature. The main theoretical background is established by
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The later quantitative exercises are developed by Arellano
(2008). Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013) extend the
Arellano (2008) to incorporate different durations of long-term sovereign bond instead of only
one period short-term bond. The model setup in this paper is based on the long-term bond
sovereign default model. The novel difference is that the paper considers the foreign currency
denominated nominal bond instead of commonly used real bond. By incorporating the
foreign currency nominal bond, the paper contributes to the literature by pointing out that
the exchange rate volatility could be an important channel that affects emerging countries’
default risk and borrowing decisions. The paper also quantitatively investigates how different
exchange rate volatilities will affect their borrowing decisions and the bond spread.
The paper is also closely linked to the reserve accumulation literature. This literature
tries to explain why emerging countries hold large amount of foreign reserves. There are
two popular views in this literature. The first is the mercantilism view, which suggests that
reserve accumulation can promote export growth by preventing appreciation (Dooley et al.
(2004)). The second is the precautionary view, which argues that reserves can act as a
self-insurance against future sudden stop events (Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Bianchi et al.
(2016), Hur and Kondo (2016) and Jeanne and Rancire (2011)). The sudden stop is known
as the quick and sharp reversal of private capital flows in emerging market economies. It is
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usually modeled as an exogenous event that happens with certain probability. For instance,
in Bianchi et al. (2016), the sudden stop is modeled as an exogenous situation where countries
are not able to borrow external debts. This paper also illustrates the precautionary motives
for reserve accumulation, but in the presence of currency mismatch and volatile exchange
rate fluctuations. These two features with defaultable debts can endogenously generate
tight borrowing constraint, which provides a micro foundation for the exogenous sudden
stop events. Moreover, the paper contributes to the literature by arguing that the exchange
rate volatility is an essential factor that increases the precautionary demand for reserve
holdings, and the paper proposes three channels through which large reserve holdings can
be rationalized.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 illustrates the empirical motivation,
section 1.3 presents the model and section 1.4 shows the quantitative results. Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Empirical Motivation
This section aims to study the empirical link between foreign currency debt, nominal ex-
change rate volatility and default risk in emerging countries. The focus on emerging countries
is due to their significant foreign currency borrowing, volatile exchange rate fluctuations and
relatively frequent default events. These features make emerging countries a good fit to
investigate my research questions.
Relevant information is collected from various sources of data. The nominal exchange
rate and foreign reserves are from International Financial Statistics. The sovereign bond
spread is from JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI). The interest rate spread
is the difference between the yield on a country’s foreign currency bond and the yield on
a comparable bond issued by United States. The external debt information is from World
Development Indicators. Specifically, for the external long-term debt, we can distinguish
between public and private debt. Moreover, among the external public debt, we can calculate
how much debt is denominated in a foreign currency. However, for the external short-term
5
debt, we only know the sum of public and private debt, instead of the amount of each debt.
The emerging countries in my sample include: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and
Venezuela. All the information allows me to construct a panel containing 15 countries from
1991Q1 to 2015Q4.
The measure of nominal exchange rate volatility for a country in a given period is the
standard deviation of quarterly depreciation of nominal exchange rate over the period. The
measure of default risk is the sovereign bond spread from EMBI, which is a common indicator
for government default risk in the sovereign default literature. Figure 1 plots trends of interest
spread and exchange rate volatility in each quarter for all countries in my sample. I use a
three years rolling windows to compute both measures, where the time indicator represents
the center of the window. The three years rolling windows are constructed to capture the
link between short-run exchange rate volatility and spread.
Figure 1 shows that there is a strong association between exchange rate volatility and
interest spread, especially for Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. Among these countries, most of the spikes in exchange rate
volatility and spread coincide with recent regional and global crises, e.g. 1997 Asian financial
crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. It implies that in addition to country-specific factors,
financial contagion and exogenous capital flows are also important in affecting the default
risk. For other countries, the positive association does not hold perfectly, suggesting that
other factors could also drive the change in spread. Overall, the figure is consistent with the
idea that nominal exchange rate volatility is essential in determining the default risk.
The associations between exchange rate volatility and spread might be driven by other
confounding factors. Next, I will use the regression analysis to control for time-invariant
country fixed effect, common global time trend, and other potential confounding factors.
The result is shown in Table 1. In the regression table, except for the nominal exchange rate
volatility measure, all other variables indicate the corresponding average value in the three
years rolling window. For the debt variables, short-term debt represents external short-term
debt to GDP ratio, and all the remaining debt variables represent the corresponding long-
term external debt to GDP ratio. Moreover, all the spread, exchange rate volatility and debt
6
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Volatility and Interest Spread
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Specification (1) and (2) show a significant and positive relationship between exchange
rate volatility and spread, which is consistent with Figure 1. Moreover, in specification (2),
we can see that conditional on the level of total external long-term public debt, an additional
unit of borrowing in foreign currency is significantly associated with a higher spread. It points
out the importance of foreign currency debt in affecting the spread.
In specification (3), (4), (5), the interaction between foreign currency debt and exchange
rate volatility is added into the regression. The positive and significant coefficients on the
interaction term indicate that for country with a higher exposure in foreign currency debt, the
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Table 1: Exchange Rate Volatility and Interest Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
ExVol 0.602∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.0848
(0.076) (0.033) (0.052) (0.047) (0.062)
FC Public Debt 0.616∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.096) (0.122) (0.160)
Public Debt -0.112∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.041) (0.071) (0.092)
FC Public Debt × ExVol 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Private Debt -0.0891∗∗∗ -0.0874∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.027)
Short-Term Debt 0.319∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.051)
N 1005 1001 1001 1001 811
adj. R2 0.61 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.90
Countries 15 15 15 15 14
Other Controls No No No No Yes
All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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association between exchange rate volatility and spread is stronger. This pattern is robust
to adding other external debt: long-term private debt and short-term debt, and also robust
to including other fundamental controls: real GDP, reserve-to-GDP ratio, current account-
to-GDP, inflation, trade-to-GDP and capital account openness measure (Chinn-Ito index).
Even though the coefficient on ExVol becomes negative after adding the interaction term,
the total effect of ExVol depends on the coefficients on both ExVol and also the interaction
term. We can see that when FC Public Debt reaches 10 percent, the overall effect of ExVol
on Spread becomes positive. In my sample, only South Africa has on average FC Public Debt
less than 10 percent. It implies that the regression coefficients on ExVol are still consistent
with the idea that in general, a higher exchange rate volatility is associated with a higher
spread.
The take-way from the above regression analysis is that foreign currency debt and ex-
change rate volatility are important in understanding the default risk. Next I will build a
sovereign default model to study this link, and investigate its implications on reserve accu-
mulation.
1.3 Model
To understand the pattern in the empirical section, I construct a sovereign default model with
following three novel features. First, I introduce nominal foreign currency assets. Specifically,
the sovereign can borrow long-term foreign currency bonds, and save in one-period foreign
currency reserves. Second, I add an exogenous nominal exchange rate shock to the model in
addition to the standard output shock, which stochastically moves the sovereign’s domestic
currency value of its foreign currency debt. Third, I introduce an exogenous link between
reserves and exchange rate volatility, estimated from the data. Next, I will present the
detailed description of the model.
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1.3.1 Endowment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... The aggregate endowment is stochastic and
follows an AR(1) process:
log yt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ log yt−1 + εt, |ρ| < 1, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
1.3.2 Preferences
The preference of the representative agent is given by:
Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−tu(cj),
where E is the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, and c is real consumption. The
utility function is strictly increasing and concave.
I assume that the benevolent sovereign can borrow and lend from international financial
markets, on behalf of its domestic hand-to-mouth agents to help them smooth consumption.
1.3.3 Nominal Exchange Rate Shock
To capture the idea that unexpected capital flows could disrupt the foreign exchange market,
and change the real value of external foreign currency debt, the nominal exchange rate
depreciation shock ξ is introduced. The depreciation shock ξt is defined as the net percentage
depreciation of nominal exchange rate compared with last period nominal exchange rate.
Mathematically we have
ξt =
et
et−1
− 1,
where et denotes the nominal exchange rate at time t, which indicates the domestic currency
value of 1 unit of foreign currency. If exchange rate depreciates at time t, that is et > et−1
and ξt > 0, then 1 unit of foreign currency becomes more valuable in terms of domestic
currency and vice versa. Therefore the exchange rate shock ξt can randomly change the
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domestic value of foreign currency assets. The depreciation shock ξt is AR(1) with time-
varying volatility. The volatility of nominal exchange rate is assumed to be determined by
the previous period’s reserves-to-GDP ratio.
ξt = ρξξt−1 + υt, |ρξ| < 1, υt ∼ N(0, σ2t ),
σ2t = exp(α1 + α2
at−1
yt−1
),
where at−1
yt−1
denotes the ratio between last period’s foreign reserves at−1 and last period’s
income yt−1. Based on my estimation which I describe in section 4, the parameter α2 is
negative. This implies that larger reserves can reduce the exchange rate volatility. It capture
the idea that higher reserves indicate higher capacity for the central bank to intervene in
foreign exchange market, which discourages speculative attacks and reduces the exchange
rate volatility.
1.3.4 International Financial Markets
The government can issue long-term bonds from foreign risk-neutral lenders, but only in
foreign currency. To model the long-term bonds in a tractable way, I follow Aguiar et al.
(2016), Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013). Specifically,
each long-term bond will pay a coupon every period up to and including the period of
maturity. Without loss of generality, the coupon payment is normalized to the risk-free
nominal interest rate r per unit of face value as in Aguiar et al. (2016). The benefit is that
with this normalization, a unit of risk-free long-term bond will have a price of one.
The long-term bond is assumed to mature randomly at probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, for
an outstanding long-term bond of measure b, a δ fraction b will mature this period and the
associated debt repayment is (r + δ)b. The continuation face value of the long-term bond is
(1 − δ)b. If the sovereign changes its outstanding debt level at the end of this period to b′ .
Then the net issuance this period is b
′− (1 − δ)b. With this setup, the expected maturity
of the long-term bond is 1
δ
. The government also has access to a one-period risk-free foreign
currency reserves, that pays 1 + r each period.
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1.3.5 Budget Constraints
Following the international macroeconomics literature, the foreign price level p∗ is set as the
numeraire, and it is assumed to be constant for all periods. To allow the depreciation shock
to have real a effect, I assume the domestic price is predetermined, that is, they are set a
period in advance but can be adjusted fully at the end of the period. Under this setting,
changes in nominal exchange rate will only affect the asset price in domestic currency, but
the goods price in domestic currency remain the same. So there is a real effect from the
depreciation shock. Given the model environment, we can formulate the budget constraints
in both nominal and real term.
Denote b˜t > 0 as the measure of outstanding foreign currency long-term bond, a˜t > 0
as the measure of foreign currency reserves. Then without default, the nominal budget
constraint is
ptct = ptyt − (r + δ)b˜tet + qtet(b˜t+1 − (1− δ)b˜t) + a˜tet − a˜t+1et
1 + r
,
where qt is the foreign currency nominal price of the bond issued by the sovereign, (r + δ)b˜t
is the foreign currency coupon payments and debt payments due, and all the terms are in
nominal domestic currency.
Now define bt+1 =
b˜t+1et
pt
, at+1 =
a˜t+1et
pt
as the real value of foreign currency debt and
reserves in terms of goods value at period t, when they are issued. The associated real
budget constraint is
ct = yt − (r + δ)b˜tet−1
pt−1
pt−1et
ptet−1
+
qtb˜t+1et
pt
− qt(1− δ)b˜tet−1
pt−1
pt−1et
ptet−1
+
a˜tet−1
pt−1
pt−1et
ptet−1
− a˜t+1et
(1 + r)pt
.
Since ξt =
et
et−1
− 1 and domestic price level is constant pt = pt−1, we have
ct = yt − (1 + ξt)(r + δ)bt + qt(bt+1 − (1 + ξt)(1− δ)bt) + (1 + ξt)at −
at+1
1 + r
,
where all the terms are in real value now, and we can see that nominal exchange rate
depreciation ξt > 0 can result in real increase in foreign currency outstanding debt bt and
also foreign currency reserves at. Next, I will present the real budget constraint when the
government defaults.
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When the government defaults, it does so on all current and future debt obligations.
But we assume after default, the government can still keep it foreign reserves. A default
triggers exclusion from borrowing in credit markets for a stochastic number of periods. The
sovereign will regain access to credit markets with a constant probability θ ∈ [0, 1]. In every
period where the sovereign is excluded from credit markets, there is a real output loss of
φ(y), which is increasing in the income.
φ(y) = max{0, d0y + d1y2}
In case of default, the sovereign will still retain the control of their foreign reserves.
Therefore the real budget constraint can be derived similarly
ct = yt − φ(y) + (1 + ξt)at −
at+1
1 + r
,
where the sovereign can only save in reserves to smooth consumption.
1.3.6 Timing
The timing within each period is as follows: First, the output shock and exchange rate shock
are realized, where the variance of the exchange rate shock depends on the reserves at the
beginning of the period. After observing these shocks, the sovereign chooses whether to
default on its debt and then makes its borrowing and saving decisions.
1.3.7 Recursive Formulation
The recursive formulation of the sovereign’s problem is described here. The sovereign cannot
commit to repay the debt. So in each period, the sovereign will compare the value of
repayment and the value of default to make its repayment decision.
Let V indicate the value function of a sovereign that is not in default. For any bond
price function q, the function V satisfies the following functional equation:
V (b, a, y, ξ) = max{V R(b, a, y, ξ), V D(a, y, ξ)}, (1.1)
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where the sovereign’s value of repayment is given by
V R(b, a, y, ξ) = max
a′>0,b′>0,c
{u(c) + βE(y′,ξ′)|(y,ξ)V (b′, a′, y′, ξ′)}, (1.2)
subject to
c = y − (1 + ξ)(r + δ)b+ q(b′ − (1 + ξ)(1− δ)b) + (1 + ξ)a− a
′
1 + r
.
The value of defaulting is given by:
V D(a, y, ξ) = max
a′>0,c
u(c) + βE(y′,ξ′)|(y,ξ)[(1− θ)V D(a′, y′, ξ′) + θV (0, a′, y′, ξ′)], (1.3)
subject to
c = y − φ(y) + (1 + ξ)a− a
′
1 + r
.
The solution to the sovereign’s problem gives the decision rules for default dˆ(b, a, y, ξ), debt
bˆ(b, a, y, ξ), reserves in default aˆD(a, y, ξ), reserves when not in default aˆR(b, a, y, ξ), consump-
tion in default cˆD(a, y, ξ), and consumption when not in default cˆR(b, a, y, ξ). The default
rule dˆ is equal to 1 if the sovereign defaults, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
1.3.8 Bond Prices
Sovereign bonds and reserves are priced in a competitive market inhabited by a large number
of identical risk-neutral international investors. Investors discount future payoffs at the risk-
free rate 1 + r. This implies that in equilibrium the bond-price function solves the following
functional equation:
q(b′, a′, y, ξ)(1 + r) = E(y′,ξ′)|(y,ξ)[(1− dˆ(b′, a′, y′, ξ′))(r + δ + (1− δ)q(b′′, a′′, y′, ξ′))], (1.4)
where
b′′ = bˆ(b′, a′, y′, ξ′)
a′′ = aˆR(b′, a′, y′, ξ′).
This means that, in equilibrium, a risk-neutral investor is indifferent between selling a bond
today, and keeping the bond to the next period. If the investor keeps the bond and the
sovereign does not default in the next period, he will receive the coupon and the debt
repayments (r+ δ). In addition, his continuation value of bond worth (1− δ) times the price
of a bond issued in the next period.
14
1.3.9 Recursive Equilibrium
I focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria. That is, in each period the sovereign’s equilibrium
default, borrowing, and saving decisions depend only on the payoff-relevant state vari-
ables. Then a Markov Perfect Equilibrium is defined by a set of value functions V, V R
and V D, rules for default dˆ, borrowing bˆ, reserves {aˆR, aˆD}, and consumption {cˆR, cˆD}, and
a bond price function q, such that: (i) given a bond price function q, the policy functions
dˆ, bˆ, aˆR, aˆD, cˆR, cˆD, and the value functions V, V R, V D solve the Bellman equations (1), (2),
and (3), and (ii) given the sovereign’s policies, the bond price function q satisfies condition
(4).
1.4 Quantitative Results
1.4.1 Calibration and Functional Forms
For the functional forms, the utility function displays a constant coefficient of relative risk
aversion,
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ , with γ 6= 1.
The endowment shock follows the standard AR(1) process :
log yt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ log yt−1 + εt, |ρ| < 1, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
The depreciation shock follows AR(1) process with time-varying volatility.
ξt = ρξξt−1 + υt, |ρξ| < 1, υt ∼ N(0, σ2t ),
σ2t = exp(α1 + α2
at−1
yt−1
),
For the default cost function, I follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013). That is φ(y) =
max{0, d0y + d1y2}, so that it is asymmetrically more costly to default in good times.
For the calibration, the paper targets Mexico as the benchmark economy, since Mexico is
a common reference for studies on emerging economics. The data for Mexico is mainly taken
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from International Financial Statistics and EMBI spread dataset from 1991Q1 to 2015Q4.
Since the calibration uses quarterly data, a period in the model will correspond to a quarter
in the data.
There are total fourteen parameters that need to be determined. The first three param-
eters discount factor β,default cost d0, d1 will be jointly calibrated to match three moments.
These are the mean external debt-to-GDP ratio of 25%, standard deviation of the interest
spread of 2.5% and the default probability of 2%.
Four parameter values will be set directly. The risk aversion γ will be set to 2 as in the
sovereign default literature. The risk-free rate r will be set to 1% to match the three-month
US treasury bill real return. The probability of reentry θ will be set to 0.083 to reflect that
on average it takes three years for countries to regain access to credit markets after default.
The debt duration δ will be set to 0.05 to match the 5 years average bond duration in Mexico
as in Broner et al. (2013)
The remaining seven parameters µ, ρ, σ2ε, ρ, σ
2
υ, α1, α2 for output shock and nominal ex-
change rate shock will be estimated based on the HP-filtered Mexico real output and the
HP-filtered nominal exchange rate data from 1991Q1 to 2015Q4. The benchmark calibration
result is shown in Table 2.
The interest spread can be calculated as follows. Firstly the yield i is calculated, which is
defined as the return an investor would earn if he holds the bond to maturity and no default
is declared. This yield satisfies
i =
r + δ
q
− (1− δ)
The sovereign spread is then computed as the difference between the yield i and the risk-free
rate r. The annualized spread is used here:
rst = (
1 + i
1 + r
)4 − 1
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Table 2: Parameter Values
Discount factor β 0.981
Output cost of defaulting d0 -1.025
Output cost of defaulting d1 1.115
Risk aversion γ 2
Risk-free rate r 1%
Probability of reentry after default θ 0.083
Debt duration δ 0.05
Output autocorrelation coefficient ρ 0.94
Depreciation autocorrelation coefficient ρυ 0.21
Standard deviation of innovations for output σ 1.5%
Standard deviation of innovations for depreciation συ 8.18%
Mean log output µ −(1/2)σ2ε
Variance for the depreciation shock α1 −4.77
Variance for the depreciation shock α2 −0.46
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1.4.2 Simulation Results
Now, the paper will firstly show the model’s fit. Then there will be quantitative exercises to
quantify the channels of the model.
Table 3 shows that the model exactly matches the three targeted moments. The model
can also generate a quantitatively reasonable interest rate spread. For the reserve holdings,
the model can explain over half of the reserve holdings. It implies that the channels in the
model are quantitatively important to understand the reserve accumulation. Meanwhile,
there are also other mechanisms that could help us understand the reserve holdings.
Table 3: Simulation Statistics
Model Data
Mean Debt-to-GDP 25 25
σ(rs) 2.5 2.5
Default probability 1.9 2
Mean rs 2.5 3.4
Mean Reserve-to-GDP 4.4 7.6
1.4.3 The Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility
In this subsection, the paper wants to investigate how different exchange rate volatility
regimes affect the government’s incentives to borrow and accumulate reserves. Moreover, we
want to test whether the model is able to replicate the following two empirical patterns.
First, if we interpret higher exchange rate volatility as a proxy for rapid financial inte-
gration and more volatile capital flows, then we want to know whether the rapid financial
integration and more volatile capital flows can explain the well-known increasing reserve
holdings. Second, in the empirical section, the paper documents a positive association be-
tween exchange rate volatility and interest rate spread. Here, we want to see whether the
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model can generate similar pattern. Since the depreciation shock follows
ξt = ρξξt−1 + υt, |ρξ| < 1, υt ∼ N(0, σ2t ),
σ2t = exp(α1 + α2
at−1
yt−1
).
We can see that part of the exchange rate volatility is exogenous and determined by α1, and
part of the volatility is endogenously determined by the reserve holdings α2
at−1
yt−1
. Here the
experiment is to see how the increase in the exogenous part of the volatility α1 affects the
government’s decisions. The result is shown in the Table 4. The label ExVol is the standard
deviation of ξt if the economy starts with zero reserve holdings. Mathematically we have
ExVol =
exp 1
2
α1
1−ρξ .
Table 4: The Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility
ExVol 0.06 0.1(Benchmark) 0.12
Mean Debt-to-GDP 30 25 23
Mean Reserve-to-GDP 2.4 4.4 4.0
Mean rs 1.4 2.5 2.8
Default Rate per 100 Years 1.2 1.9 2.0
Table 4 shows that if the economy moves from a low exchange rate volatility regime of
0.06 to the higher benchmark exchange rate volatility regime of 0.1, the government optimally
reduces borrowing and increases reserve holdings. It suggests that when the exchange rate
volatility is increasing from a relatively low level, increasing reserve accumulation is better
than reducing external borrowing to limit the exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. So the
change of volatility regime from 0.06 to 0.1 is consistent with the idea that rapid financial
integration and more volatile capital flows can explain the increasing reserve accumulation.
However, this is not always true. If the exchange rate volatility is increasing from the
benchmark of 0.1 to a higher level of 0.12, then the model predicts that using reserves to
pay back debt is better than increasing reserve holdings. It suggests that in a relative high
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volatility regime, rapid financial integration and more volatile capital flows may not explain 
the increasing reserve holdings.
For the relationship between exchange rate volatility and interest spread, the model pre-
dicts the same positive correlation as in the data, and it is true for both regime changes. It 
implies that high exchange rate volatility always increase the default risk even with precau-
tionary measures by the governments.
1.4.4 Reserve Accumulation to Hedge the Depreciation
The model predicts three different channels for reserve accumulation: consumption smooth-
ing when borrowing is costly, hedging against depreciation shocks, and reducing exchange 
rate volatility. Bianchi et al. (2016) show that different maturity of debt and reserves can 
make reserve a good hedge against rollover risk and help smooth consumption when future 
borrowing is costly. They also show that this channel is quantitatively important. Here, I 
want to investigate whether the two novel channels for reserve accumulation are also quan-
titatively important.
Since both debt and reserves are in foreign currency, although exchange rate depreciation 
increases the real debt burden, it also increase the real value of reserves. So foreign currency 
reserves can be a good hedge against depreciation shock. To isolate the effect of currency 
hedge, I recalibrate a model where the reserves are denominated in home currency, to see 
whether there is large decrease in reserve holdings compared with the benchmark. The result 
is shown in Table 5.
The result shows that after recalibrating the model with domestic currency reserves, the 
reserve holdings decrease 50%, which implies that the foreign currency feature of the reserve 
is important to explain the large reserve holdings. On the other hand, even if the reserve is 
in home currency, the model still predicts 2.1% of reserve holdings. This suggests that it is 
important to have an asset that has the same return in all states of the world, so that the 
government will find it optimal to issue defaultable debt to purchase this assets, to transfer 
resources from future good states to future bad states.
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Table 5: The Effects of Currency Hedge
Currency of Reserves Foreign Currency Domestic Currency
Mean Debt-to-GDP 25 25
σ(rs) 2.5 2.4
Default probability 1.9 2
Mean rs 2.5 2.6
Mean Reserve-to-GDP 4.4 2.1
1.4.5 Reserve Accumulation for Less Exchange Rate Volatility
Lastly, to quantitatively evaluate the role of using reserves to reduce the exchange rate
volatility, I shut down this channel by setting α2 = 0. Then I recalibrate the new model to
the same moments to see the quantify of reserve accumulation. The result is shown in Table
6.
Table 6: Role of Reserves to Reduce ExVol
Benchmark α2 = 0
Mean Debt-to-GDP 25 25
σ(rs) 2.5 2.6
Default probability 1.9 2
Mean rs 2.5 2.6
Mean Reserve-to-GDP 4.4 1.3
After shutting down the channel, we see a large drop in the reserve accumulation. It
suggests that in an environment where the government is only allowed to borrow in foreign
currency, the volatile exchange rate becomes a major risk for the government. The gov-
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ernment is willing to triple the reserves from 1.3% to 4.4% to capture the benefits of using
reserve to reduce the exchange rate volatility. The results also point out the important role
of reserves for foreign exchange market management.
1.5 Conclusion
The paper investigates how nominal exchange rate volatility affects a government’s default
risk and its incentive to accumulate reserves. To understand the rationale, I construct a
sovereign default model, where the government facing volatile exchange rate fluctuations
can borrow and save in foreign currency.
In this model, whenever nominal exchange rate depreciates, debt burden in terms of
domestic currency increases, leading to higher default risk. Based on the model structure,
the paper proposes three channels through which reserve accumulation can insure against
the volatile exchange rate movements. Specifically, it can help smooth consumption when
borrowing becomes costly, hedge against depreciation in the exchange rate, and stabilize the
fluctuations in exchange rate. Quantitatively, the paper shows that the calibrated model
can generate more than half of the reserve holdings. It can also replicate the increasing
reserve holdings and the positive link between exchange rate volatility and interest rate
spread. Moreover, all the channels of reserve accumulation are shown to be quantitatively
important.
From the paper, we learn that borrowing in foreign currency can add to vulnerability for a
government if it faces volatile exchange rate fluctuations. Facing the vulnerability, if the gov-
ernment does not hold enough reserves, once a country-specific shock or financial contagion
hits, it becomes much difficult for the government to repay its debt, and thereby increasing
the default risk. In this sense, the model has an intuitive prediction that accumulating both
debt and reserves are optimal to insure against the vulnerability.
However, the prediction is invalid if the nominal exchange rate volatility is relatively
high. In this case, the additional reserve accumulation will increase the gross debt position,
and the cost of higher gross debt and reserve level may outweigh the insurance benefits of
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reserve accumulation. Therefore, the predicted optimal choice is to reduce debt and reserve
to become closer to the financial autarky. This prediction hinges on the importance to
regulate and limit massive amount of speculative capital flows.
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2.0 Household Portfolio Accounting
Joint with
Sewon Hur, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Christopher Telmer, Carnegie Mellon University
2.1 Introduction
Housing and stock markets can provide a great opportunity for households to invest and
accumulate wealth. However, more than 20 percent of households do not own any risky
assets, defined as stocks, real estate, and non-corporate business, according to the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF, 2016). A large literature has focused on this extensive mar-
gin, for example, Attanasio and Paiella (2011), Chambers et al. (2009), Guvenen (2009),
Khorunzhina (2013), Luttmer (1999), and Paiella (2007). Less is understood about the het-
erogeneity in the portfolio composition. For example, 10 percent of risky asset owners invest
less than 40 percent of their wealth in risky assets, while 15 percent invest more than 200
percent of their wealth in risky assets (SCF 2016). In this project, we focus on accounting
for differences in household portfolios, including this intensive margin.
We develop a benchmark life-cycle model with labor income risk and portfolio choice
(Cocco et al. (2005)), augmented with a savings wedge that lowers the return on saving and
a risky wedge that lowers the relative return on risky assets. In the first part of the paper,
we show that various models are equivalent to our benchmark model with wedges. In the
second part of the paper, we develop a methodology to estimate these wedges from the data.
We apply this method to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF 2004–2016), the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID, 2005–2015) and the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP, 2004–2012) and compute household-level wedges that rationalize the
data, in the spirit of Chari et al. (2007). These wedges are a novel and useful diagnostic
that is informative about how far household portfolios are from the optimum, controlling for
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household characteristics.
This paper has two main objectives. First, we use the wedges to guide plausible frictions
that researchers should consider. Second, we analyze the extent to which household charac-
teristics can account for the wedges. For example, we find that risky wedges are smaller for
college graduates, self-employed households, and home owners. White households have larger
risky wedges but smaller savings wedges. Moreover, we find that risky wedges and savings
wedges exhibit a strong negative correlation. One interpretation could be that households
are heterogeneous in preferences and that more risk-averse households are less patient. Alter-
natively, we show that the negative correlation of risky and savings wedges can be generated
with binding borrowing constraints. The next step in this research agenda is to quantita-
tively assess which frictions and model ingredients are the most significant in accounting for
the differences in household portfolio choices in the U.S.
Our paper builds on the wedge accounting method developed by Chari et al. (2007), and
is related to works by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) who
measure firm-level wedges to measure resource misallocation. See Hopenhayn (2014) for an
excellent review on the literature on firm-level wedges and misallocation. To our knowledge,
our paper is the only research on measuring household-level wedges, with the exception of
Berger et al. (2019) who focus on imperfect risk-sharing and aggregate fluctuations.
We build on a large literature that has used life-cycle models to understand portfolio
choice. See, for example, Angeletos et al. (2001), Cocco et al. (2005), Davis et al. (2006),
Gomes and Michaelides (2005), Hu (2005), Kaplan and Violante (2014), and Storesletten et
al. (2007) for some recent works. Our paper is also related to works that attempt to account
for differences in household portfolios (Bianchi 2018, Calvet et al. 2007, Cole et al. 2014,
Fagereng et al. 2016, von Gaudecker 2015, Grinblatt et al. 2011, Guiso et al. 1996, Heaton
and Lucas 2000, and Van Rooij et al. 2011) and in wealth (Carroll 2000, Castaneda et al.
2003, De Nardi 2004, Gabaix et al. 2016, Krusell and Smith 1998). Campbell (2006) and
De Nardi and Fella (2017) provide excellent reviews of these literatures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the benchmark model
with wedges and show that many models with frictions are equivalent to the benchmark
model with wedges. Section 2.3 then describes the process of measuring wedges at the
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household level and section 2.4 provides an analysis of the measured wedges. Finally, section
2.5 concludes by discussing directions for future research.
2.2 Model
In this section, we develop a benchmark model of portfolio with wedges and show that many
models with frictions are equivalent to our model with wedges. We use the benchmark model
with wedges later to account for household portfolios observed in the U.S. in the next section.
2.2.1 Benchmark Model with Wedges
Consider a life-cycle model with portfolio choice, uninsurable labor income risk, and mortality
risk, similar to the Cocco et al. (2005). At age j, the household experiences one of finitely
many shocks, denoted by sj, and s
j = (s1, ..., sj) denotes the history of events up through
age j. The probability of any particular history sj is given by pij(s
j). The benchmark model
has four exogenous stochastic variables, all of which are functions of the underlying history
sj: the safe wedge 1 + τ sj(s
j), the risky wedge 1 + τxj(s
j), labor income yj(s
j), and risky
return Rxj(s
j).
Households choose a sequence of consumption and safe and risky assets to maximize
expected lifetime utility,
max
J∑
j=1
∑
sj
βj−1pij
(
sj
)(j−2∏
a=1
ψa
)[
ψj−1u
(
cj
(
sj
))
+ ω(1− ψj−1)u
(
dj
(
sj
))]
(2.1)
s.t. cj
(
sj
)
+
[
bj+1
(
sj
)
+ xj+1
(
sj
) (
1 + τxj
(
sj
))] (
1 + τ sj
(
sj
))
= Rbj
(
sj−1
)
+Rxj
(
sj
)
xj
(
sj−1
)
+ yj
(
sj
)
+ Tj
(
sj
)
dj
(
sj
)
= Rbj
(
sj−1
)
+Rxj
(
sj
)
xj
(
sj−1
)
+ yj
(
sj
)
,
where cj(s
j) denotes consumption, bj(s
j−1) is safe assets, xj(sj−1) is risky assets, R is the
safe return, β is the discount factor, ψj is the survival probability from age j to j+ 1, Tj(s
j)
is lump-sum transfers, and dj(s
j) is the wealth the household bequeaths to its descendants
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at death. To ease notation, we set the bequest motive ω to zero for the remainder of this
section. The optimal allocation is summarized by
cj
(
sj
)
+ bj+1
(
sj
)
+ xj+1
(
sj
)
= Rbj
(
sj−1
)
+Rxj
(
sj
)
xj
(
sj−1
)
+ yj
(
sj
)
, (2.2)
1 + τ sj
(
sj
)
= β
∑
sj+1
pij
(
sj+1|sj)u′ (cj+1 (sj+1))
u′ (cj (sj))
R, (2.3)
1 + τxj
(
sj
)
=
∑
sj+1
pij (s
j+1|sj)u′ (cj+1 (sj+1))Rx,j+1 (sj+1)∑
sj+1
pij (sj+1|sj)u′ (cj+1 (sj+1))R
, (2.4)
where pij (s
j+1|sj) denotes the conditional probability pij (sj+1) /pij (sj).
It is straightforward to show that the benchmark model with no wedges but heterogene-
ity in discount factors are equivalent to the benchmark model with heterogeneous savings
wedges. If risky returns follow Rxj(s
j) = R+µ+η(sj) where E[η(sj)] = 0, one can also show
that benchmark model with no wedges but heterogeneity in excess returns, µ, are equiva-
lent to the benchmark model with heterogeneous risky wedges. In the next subsections, we
illustrate how other models map into the benchmark model with wedges.
2.2.2 Collateral Constraints
Consider a model with a borrowing constraint, in which households solve
max
J∑
j=1
∑
sj
βj−1pij (sj)
(
j−1∏
a=1
ψa
)
u (cj (s
j))
s.t. cj (s
j) + bj+1 (s
j) + xj+1 (s
j)
= Rbj (s
j−1) +Rxj (sj)xj (sj−1) + yj (sj)
−bj+1 (sj) ≤ κxj+1 (sj)
where κ ≥ 0 is the fraction of risky assets that can be collateralized.
Let c∗j (s
j) and µ∗j (s
j) βj−1pij (sj)
(∏j−1
a=1 ψa
)
represent the optimal allocation for con-
sumption and the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint, respectively. The alloca-
tion in the problem with borrowing constraints is equivalent to the benchmark model with
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wedges if and only if
1 + τ sj
(
sj
)
=
u′
(
c∗j (s
j)
)− µ∗j (sj)
u′
(
c∗j (sj)
) , (2.5)
1 + τxj
(
sj
)
=
u′
(
c∗j (s
j)
)− κµ∗j (sj)
u′ (cj∗ (sj))− µ∗j (sj)
. (2.6)
Notice that τ sj (s
j) ≤ 0 with strict inequality when the collateral constraint is binding.
Furthermore, τxj (s
j) > 0 if and only if the collateral constraint is binding and κ < 1, which
is the empirically relevant range, as discussed in Hur (2018).
2.2.3 Financial Knowledge
Consider a model with investment in financial knowledge, in which households solve
max
J∑
j=1
∑
sj
βj−1pij (sj)
(
j−1∏
a=1
ψa
)
u (cj (s
j))
s.t. cj (s
j) + bj+1 (s
j) + q (fj+1 (s
j))xj+1 (s
j) + fj+1 (s
j)
= Rbj (s
j−1) +Rxj (sj)xj (sj−1) + yj (sj)
fj+1 (s
j) ≥ 0
where fj+1 (s
j) ≥ 0 is financial knowledge, which we—without loss of generality—assume is
in units of the consumption good and changes the risky return by decreasing q. We assume
that q(0) = 1 and that q is strictly decreasing and convex.
Let f ∗j+1 (s
j) represent the optimal allocation for financial knowledge. The allocation in
the problem with financial knowledge is equivalent to the benchmark model with wedges if
and only if
τ sj
(
sj
)
= 0, (2.7)
1 + τxj
(
sj
)
= q
(
f ∗j+1
(
sj
))
, (2.8)
Tj
(
sj
)
= −f ∗j+1
(
sj
)
. (2.9)
Notice that the risky wedge is decreasing in financial knowledge.
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2.2.4 Housing
Consider a model with housing, in which households solve
max
J∑
j=1
∑
sj
βj−1pij (sj)
(
j−1∏
a=1
ψa
)
[u (cj (s
j)) + v (hj+1 (s
j))]
s.t. cj (s
j) + bj+1 (s
j) + xj+1 (s
j)
= Rbj (s
j−1) +Rxj (sj)xj (sj−1) + yj (sj)
hj+1 (s
j) ≤ ζxj+1 (sj)
where hj+1 (s
j) and ζ are the consumption of housing services and the service flow rate of
housing provided by the risky asset, respectively.
Let c∗j (s
j) and x∗j+1 (s
j) represent the optimal allocations for consumption and risky as-
sets, respectively. The allocation in the problem with housing is equivalent to the benchmark
model with wedges if and only if
τ sj
(
sj
)
= 0, (2.10)
τxj
(
sj
)
= −ζ v
′ (ζx∗j+1 (sj))
u′
(
c∗j (sj)
) , (2.11)
Tj
(
sj
)
= x∗j+1
(
sj
)
τxj
(
sj
)
. (2.12)
Notice that the housing service role of risky assets, measured by ζ, reduces the risky wedge.
2.2.5 Interpretation of Wedges
We have demonstrated that risky wedges are related to the risky return, collateral constraints,
financial knowledge, and service flows provided by risky assets. In general, we interpret
differences in risky wedges as potentially being generated by differences in willingness to
take risk (risk aversion), ability to take risk (constraints), actual or perceived differences in
the risky return, which in turn could represent differences in financial knowledge, et cetera.
Differences in savings wedges can potentially be generated by differences in the safe
return R and patience β, which in turn could represent unmodeled changes in family size
and composition, differences in mortality risk, and any other factors that generate variation
in the marginal utility of consumption (see, for example, Glover et al. 2011).
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2.3 Wedge Estimation
We now describe the process for estimating the wedges. In this section, we assume that
the stochastic processes are such that the household’s relevant states are a set of exogenous
shocks, sj, which follow a Markov process, and an endogenous state: wealth wj. We follow
Cocco et al. (2005) for many functional forms, stochastic processes, and parameter values.
2.3.1 Labor Income Process
Households can live up to J periods, with exogenous retirement after age j∗. Working age
(j ≤ j∗) labor income y is given by
yj(z, v, ε) = e
fj(z)+v+ε (2.13)
where f is a deterministic function of age j and other household characteristics z (education
and race), ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) is a transitory shock, and v is a persistent shock, which follows
v′ = v + u (2.14)
where u ∼ N(0, σ2u). For computational tractability, we assume that retirees (j > j∗) receive
a constant fraction λ of permanent labor income in the last working age j∗.
2.3.2 Wedges
Similar to the labor income process, the wedges are assumed to have deterministic and
stochastic components. Specifically, wedges follow
τmj(z, εm) = gmj(z) + εm for m = x, s (2.15)
where gm is a deterministic function of age j and other household characteristics z and
εm ∼ N(0, σ2εm) is an idiosyncratic shock that is independent across agents and over time.
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2.3.3 Recursive Formulation
Let w = Rb+ Rxx+ y denote household cash-on-hand. Furthermore,let s ≡ {z, v, ε, εx, εs}.
The household’s problem can be written as:
Vj(w, s) = max
b′,x′
u(c) + βER′x,s′
[
ψjVj+1(w
′, s′) + ω
(
1− ψj
)
u(w′)
]
(2.16)
s.t. c+ (x′(1 + τxj(s)) + b′)(1 + τ sj(s)) = w + Tj(w, s)
w′ = b′R + x′R′x + yj+1(s
′).
Note that the state space can be simplified even further, given the assumption that the
persistent shock is a random walk, as described in Cocco et al. (2005). See Appendix A for
details. We impose the condition that
T (w, s) =x∗j+1(w, s)((1 + τxj(s))(1 + τ sj(s))− 1) + b∗j+1(w, s)τ sj(s)
where x∗j+1(w, s) and b
∗
j+1(w, s) denote the policy functions for risky and safe assets, respec-
tively. Notice that households take contemporaneous transfers as given, but internalize the
fact that investment decisions today affect future transfers. The solution to (2.16) can be
characterized by:
c∗j(w, s) + x
∗
j+1(w, s) + b
∗
j+1(w, s) = w (2.17)
1 + τ sj(s) =
βER′x,s′
[
∂(ψjVj+1(w′,s′)+ω(1−ψj)u(w′))
∂w′ R
]
u′(c∗j(w, s))
(2.18)
1 + τxj(s) =
ER′x,s′
[
∂(ψjVj+1(w′,s′)+ω(1−ψj)u(w′))
∂w′ R
′
x
]
ER′x,s′
[
∂(ψjVj+1(w′,s′)+ω(1−ψj)u(w′))
∂w′ R
] (2.19)
where c∗j(w, s) is the policy functions for consumption.
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2.3.4 Algorithm for Solving Wedges
Here, we discuss the algorithm for solving the household-level wedges that rationalize the
data. The last-period value function is given by vJ(w, s) = u(w). For each household i,
we observe age j, household characteristics zdatai , labor income y
data
i , risky assets x
data
i , safe
assets bdatai , and in the case of the PSID, we also observe consumption c
data
i . We face the
problem that we are unable to distinguish between transitory and persistent shocks in the
data. We proceed by assuming that the transitory shock is zero, ε = 0, so that
vi =

log ydatai − fj(zdatai ) if j ≤ j∗
log
ydatai
λ
− fj∗(zdatai ) otherwise
(2.20)
where fj(z) is obtained by regressing log(yi) on age and college dummies, their interaction,
and race and year dummies. For a given guess of the wedge functions gsj(z) and gxj(z), by
backward induction for j < J , we can obtain the risky wedges using equation (2.19), and in
the case of the PSID, the saving wedges using (2.18). Once we have obtained the wedges,
we regress the wedges on age j and household characteristics z to estimate g. We iterate
these steps until g converges. See appendix B for details. Note that when we do not have
consumption data as is the case with the SCF and SIPP, we can solve for the risky wedges
and gxj(z) given any functional form for gsj(z). In particular, we use the gsj(z) estimated
from the PSID. Since our focus is on the intensive margin, we only study households with
positive risky assets.
2.3.5 Parameters and Functional Forms
We use standard parameters and functional forms from the literature. Preferences are sum-
marized by
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ (2.21)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We set the risk aversion to 2, which is a
standard value in the macro literature. We set the bequest motive parameter, ω, to 1, one
of the values considered in Cocco et al. (2005).
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We estimate the labor income process on disposable labor income from the PSID, similar
to Krueger et al. (2016) and Hur (2018). First, we compute disposable labor income on the
PSID 1970–1997 core sample of households (ages 23–65), by adding transfers to labor income
and subtracting taxes estimated through TAXSIM version 9. Second, we obtain residuals
from a regression with age, white, college, and year fixed effects and the interaction of age and
college fixed effects. The deterministic age-profiles, fj(z), for white college and non-college
graduates and non-white college and non-college graduates are also generated from this
regression. Figure 2 plots these profiles. Finally, we estimate, using the generalized method
of moments (GMM), the random walk process specified in (2.13). The estimation yields
permanent shock variance of σ2u = 0.0120, and a transitory shock variance of σ
2
ε = 0.1093.
For retired households, we estimate the replacement rate, λ, for each demographic group,
based on the average log difference between real disposable labor income and predicted
income.
Figure 2: Disposable Labor Income Profile
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Following Cocco et al. (2005), we assume that the risky asset shock follows Rx = R+µ+η
where µ = 0.04 represents the average excess return and η ∼ N(0, ση) is normally distributed
with ση = 0.157. Also following Cocco et al. (2005), the discount factor is set to 0.96 and
the risk-free rate is set to 2 percent. The parameter values are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: Parameter Values
parameters values target/source
last working age j∗ 40 age 65
discount factor β 0.96 Cocco et al. (2005)
risk aversion γ 2 standard macro value
var(transitory shocks) σ2ε 0.1093 authors’ estimation
var(permanent shocks) σ2u 0.0120 authors’ estimation
replacement rate λ 0.79–1.00 authors’ estimation
risk-free rate (R− 1) 0.02 Cocco et al. (2005)
excess risky return µ 0.04 Cocco et al. (2005)
st. dev. of risky return ση 0.157 Cocco et al. (2005)
bequest motive intensity ω 1 TBD
2.4 Wedge Analysis
In this section, we present the estimated wedges. Risky and safe wedges have been winsorized
at the 1 percent and the 10 percent level, respectively.
2.4.1 Wedge Patterns
Figure 3 plots the the time series of both wedges. Panel (a) demonstrates that the risky
wedges are sizable and are consistent across the three data sets, while panel (b) shows that
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the savings wedge is negative and stable over time. For the remaining analysis, we report
wedges estimated from the PSID.
Figure 3: Wedges over Time
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We find that risky wedges vary significantly across households, as shown in Figure 4
panel (a). In addition, more than 90 percent of households have a positive wedge, implying
that these households are under-investing in risky assets. Panel (b) indicates an even larger
variance for savings wedges.
Figure 5 shows a bin scatter plot for risky and savings wedges. We find a strong negative
correlation between risky and savings wedges. This is noteworthy since we documented that
collateral constraints can generate wedges with positive risky wedges and negative savings
wedges in section 2.2.2.
Figure 6 plots average wedges over the life-cycle. We find that risky wedges are relatively
constant across age and that savings wedges are hump-shaped with a discontinuity around
retirement. One factor that decreases the savings wedges in retirement is the fact that,
in the model, retired households’ only source of uncertainty is in their risky asset returns.
Another factor is that retired households have different consumption bundles than working
age households (for example, see Aguiar and Hurst 2005 and Aguiar and Hurst 2013).
Figures 7–11 plot the wedges by various household characteristics. We find that risky
and savings wedges decline with education, suggesting that informational frictions may be
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Figure 4: Wedge Distributions
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Figure 5: Risky and Saving Wedges
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Figure 6: Wedges over the Life-Cycle
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important. Surprisingly, risky wedges are higher for male heads. This implies that, con-
trolling for household characteristics, including income and wealth, males do not take more
risky asset positions, an implication that is at odds with the claim that women are more
risk-averse than men (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). There is a gender difference in the
savings wedges, which could be the result of differences in, for example, family size and
composition.
Home ownership and self-employment decrease risky wedges significantly, suggesting that
these are important channels that need to be considered. We also find that white households
have savings wedges but slightly higher risky wedges, a finding that is different Gittleman and
Wolff (2004) who document that, controlling for income, there is no difference in savings rates
or capital returns. Moreover, to the extent that the higher risky wedge and lower savings
wedge could the result of a tighter collateral constraint (see section 2.2.2), our finding is
in contrast to most of the literature on discriminatory lending practices, reviewed by Ladd
(1998).
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Figure 7: Wedges and Education
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Figure 8: Wedges and Gender
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Figure 9: Wedges and Home Ownership
(a) Risky Wedges
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Figure 10: Wedges and Self-Employment
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Figure 11: Wedges and Race
(a) Risky Wedges
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Figure 12: Wedges and Income
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Figure 13: Wedges and Wealth
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Finally, we find that risky wedges are increasing in disposable labor income and that
savings wedges are declining in wealth (Figures 12 and 13). As we show below, however,
some of the documented relationships, such as that between risky wedges and income are
not robust in a more systematic analysis.
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2.4.2 Wedge Regression
To analyze the wedges in a more systematic way, we regress the wedges on various household
characteristics. In columns (1) and (4) of Table 8, we regress the risky and savings wedges,
respectively, on the natural logarithms of disposable labor income and wealth. In the same
table, columns (2) and (5) include household controls and columns (3) and (6) include
household fixed effects.
A few observations are worth highlighting. First, notice that risky wedges increase with
income and wealth, whereas savings wedges decline with income and wealth. Second, risky
wedges are higher was for males, white, and retired households and are lower for college
graduates, home owners, self-employed households, and stock owners. The effect for retired
and self-employed households and stock owners are robust to including household fixed ef-
fects. Finally, savings wedges are higher for self-employed households and are lower for male,
white, and retired households, college graduates, home owners, and stock owners. The effect
for retired households and stock owners are robust to household fixed effects. Most of these
relationships confirm the patterns documented in Figures 6–13.
42
T
ab
le
8:
W
ed
ge
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
ri
sk
y
w
ed
ge
(p
er
ce
n
t)
sa
v
in
g
w
ed
ge
(p
er
ce
n
t)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
n
o
co
n
tr
ol
s
co
n
tr
ol
s
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
F
E
n
o
co
n
tr
ol
s
co
n
tr
ol
s
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
F
E
ln
(i
n
co
m
e)
0.
22
∗∗
∗
0.
34
∗∗
∗
0.
71
∗∗
∗
-2
1.
72
∗∗
∗
-3
0.
34
∗∗
∗
-3
3.
35
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.6
1)
ln
(w
ea
lt
h
)
0.
05
∗∗
∗
0.
09
∗∗
∗
0.
15
∗∗
∗
-3
.9
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
4∗
∗∗
-0
.6
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
5)
m
a
le
0.
21
∗∗
∗
-1
2.
97
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
(0
.8
2)
co
ll
eg
e
-0
.3
0
∗∗
∗
-2
.2
0
(0
.0
2)
(0
.6
1)
w
h
it
e
0.
17
∗∗
∗
-9
.4
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
(0
.7
4)
re
ti
re
d
0.
29
∗∗
∗
0.
40
∗∗
∗
-2
7.
33
∗∗
∗
-2
4.
76
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
5)
(1
.3
2)
(1
.4
0)
h
o
m
e
ow
n
er
-1
.6
3∗
∗∗
-1
.8
1∗
∗∗
-8
.6
0∗
∗∗
1.
00
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
6)
(1
.0
4)
(1
.5
9)
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
-0
.5
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
5
2.
75
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
6
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.8
3)
(1
.1
2)
st
o
ck
ow
n
er
-0
.3
0∗
∗∗
-0
.3
2∗
∗∗
-1
0.
16
∗∗
∗
-3
.6
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.6
1)
(0
.7
4)
ot
h
er
co
n
tr
o
ls
n
o
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
ye
s
ad
j.
R
2
0.
02
0.
10
0.
47
0.
16
0.
40
0.
62
N
24
54
4
24
52
1
24
52
1
24
54
4
24
52
1
24
52
1
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
O
th
er
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
a
g
e
a
n
d
a
g
e
sq
u
a
re
d
,
a
n
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
si
ze
.
∗
p
<
0
.1
0,
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0.
01
43
2.5 Conclusion
From the wedge analysis, we find that many household characteristics are important to
understand the heterogeneity in household portfolio choice. For instance, retired people,
home-owners and stock owners have much different risky and saving wedges compared with
others. This implies that standard portfolio choice choice models miss certain important
ingredients to match the investment behaviors of the household.
The next steps in this research agenda is to quantitatively assess the significance of
model frictions and ingredients in accounting for household portfolios in the U.S. Specifically,
we plan to augment the benchmark model with various frictions (borrowing constraints,
adjustment costs, etc.) and ingredients (housing, preference shocks, etc.) to evaluate which
elements reduce both the average size and variance of the wedges.
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Appendix A
Reducing the State Variables
The problem we need to solve is
Vt(wt, e
vt , εt, ε
x
t , ε
s
t) = max
xt+1,bt+1
u(ct) + βψtEηt+1,ut+1,εt+1Vt+1(wt+1, e
vt+1 , εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)
s.t. ct + xt+1(1 + τx(·))(1 + τ s(·)) + bt+1(1 + τ s(·)) = wt + yt(vt, εt) + Tt
Tt = x
∗
t+1[(1 + τx(·))(1 + τ s(·))− 1] + b∗t+1τ s(·)
wt+1 = xt+1Rx + bt+1R
Where x∗t+1, b
∗
t+1 denotes the optimal risky and safe investment. The problem can be rewrit-
ten as
Vt(wt, e
vt , εt, ε
x
t , ε
s
t) = max
st,αt
u(ct) + βψtEηt+1,ut+1,εt+1Vt+1(wt+1, e
vt+1 , εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)
s.t. ct = [1− st(1 + τ s(·))(1 + αtτx(·))][wt + yt(vt, εt)] + Tt
wt+1 = st(wt + yt(vt, εt))(αtRx + (1− αt)R)
where s∗t , α
∗
t denotes the optimal saving rate and risky share. Also we have
yt(vt, εt) = e
f(t,zt)+vt+εt
vt = vt−1 + ut
st =
xt+1 + bt+1
wt + yt(vt, εt)
αt =
xt+1
xt+1 + bt+1
We can simplify the problem by normalizing the variables by the permanent income evt
w˜t =
wt
evt
, x˜t+1 =
xt+1
evt
, b˜t+1 =
bt+1
evt
c˜t =
ct
evt
, a˜t =
at
evt
, T˜t =
Tt
evt
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Where at is the cash-on-hand
at = wt + yt(vt, εt)
a˜t = w˜t + yt(0, εt)
We can show that the new problem Wt(a˜t, ε
x
t , ε
s
t) gives us the same decision rules st, αt as in
the original problem Vt(wt, e
vt , εt, ε
x
t , ε
s
t). After the transformation, we reduce the number of
state variables to one.
Wt(a˜t, ε
x
t , ε
s
t) = max
st,αt
u(c˜t) + βψtEηt+1,ut+1,εt+1(e
ut+1)1−σWt+1(a˜t+1, εxt+1, ε
s
t+1)
s.t. c˜t = [1− st(1 + τ s(·))(1 + αtτx(·))]a˜t + T˜t
a˜t+1 = sta˜t(αtRx + (1− αt)R)/eut+1 + yt+1(0, εt+1)
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Appendix B
Computational Algorithm
We solve for the value function and the optimal policy functions using a discrete state space
approach. The algorithm entails an inner loop to calculate the value functions and individual
wedges given the deterministic wedge profiles, and an outer loop to update the deterministic
wedge profiles. Convergence occurs when the the deterministic wedge profiles is consistent
with the fitted age profiles on individual wedges.
B.1 Discretize State Space
We discretize the state a˜t using Na points, ε
x
t and ε
s
t both using Nx points. For the decision
rules, we use Ns points for the saving rate, and Nalpha points for thhe risky share.
B.2 Discretize Income Process and Risky Return
Using the Tauchen method, we obtain the transition matrices and the grids for the permanent
income shock ut, idiosyncratic income shock εt, and stock return Rx.
B.3 Initial Guess for the Wedge Profiles
To solve for the value function and individual wedges, we need to know the wedge profiles
for both risky and saving wedges. We set the first guess to zero, which corresponds to the
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case with no wedges.
gx(j, z) = gs(j, z) = 0
std(εx) = std(εs) = 0
B.4 Value Function Iteration and Wedge Profile Calculation
1. Given wedge profiles gx(j, z), gs(j, z), find optimal value function and decision rules by
backward induction
(a) No saving in the last period, WT (a˜T , ε
x
T , ε
s
T ) can be solved easily.
(b) Need to guess for the individual transfer T˜t to solve the problem Wt(a˜t, ε
x
t , ε
s
t).
(c) At each state (a˜t, ε
x
t ε
s
t), given the Wt+1(a˜t+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1) and T˜t, we use the grid search
to solve for the optimal decision rules st(·), αt(·). Then update the T˜ newt as
T˜ newt = (1−mT )T˜t +mT (αt(·)τ s(·) + (1− αt(·))((1 + τ s(·))(1 + τx(·))− 1))st(·)a˜t
where mT controls the speed of updating.
(d) Repeat step(c) until transfer convergence, i.e.
T˜ newt − T˜t
a˜t
< 
Let the initial guess T˜t = 0
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2. After solving the value function Wt(a˜t, ε
x
t , ε
s
t), we can solve for the individual wedges
as described in the main paper. One thing to notice is the mapping for the derivative
calculation. We are interested in
∂Vt+1(wt+1,e
vt+1 ,εt+1,εxt+1,ε
s
t+1)
∂wt+1
∂Vt+1(wt+1, e
vt+1 , εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)
∂wt+1
= lim
∆→0
Vt+1(wt+1 + ∆, e
vt+1 , εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)− Vt+1(wt+1, evt+1 , εt+1, εxt+1, εst+1)
∆
= lim
∆→0
Vt+1(
wt+1+∆
evt+1
, 1, εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)− Vt+1( wt+1evt+1 , 1, εt+1, εxt+1, εst+1)
∆
evt+1
(evt+1)−σ
= lim
∆
e
vt+1→0
Vt+1(w˜t+1 +
∆
evt+1
, 1, εt+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)− Vt+1(w˜t+1, 1, εt+1, εxt+1, εst+1)
∆
evt+1
(evt+1)−σ
= lim
∆
e
vt+1→0
Wt+1(a˜t+1 +
∆
evt+1
, εxt+1, ε
s
t+1)−Wt+1(a˜t+1, εxt+1, εst+1)
∆
evt+1
(evt+1)−σ
=
∂Wt+1(a˜t+1, ε
x
t+1, ε
s
t+1)
∂a˜t+1
(evt+1)−σ
3. Next, the individual wedges are regressed on a cubic function of age, and its iteration
with education and race respectively to update the wedge profiles.
τxi = βxxi + ε
x
i
τ si = βsxi + ε
s
i
where xi denotes individual age cubic function, and its iteration with education and race.
Then we update the wedge profiles according to
βnewx = mxβx + (1−mx)βoldx
βnews = msβs + (1−ms)βolds
The new standard deviation is fully updated based on std(εxi ) and std(ε
s
i ).
4. Repeat step 1 until convergence, i.e.
||βnewx − βx||+ ||βnews − βs|| < 
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